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INDIVIDUAL PETITION TO THE COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY*
W. PAUL GORMLEYt
The right of an individual, group, or non-governmental entity to ob-
tain a hearing on the merits of a dispute before the Court of Justice of
the European Economic Community has been severely restricted by the
Rome treaties.' In curtailing the broader right of individual petition
formerly contained in article 33 of the Paris Treaty,2 article 173 of the
EEC Treaty has placed community organization and member states in a
favored position.
Admittedly, the treaty drafters clearly desired to restrict individual
locus standi. Article 173(2), containing the right of direct petition to the
Luxembourg tribunal, provides: "Any natural or legal person may, un-
der the same conditions [as a member state, the council or the commis-
sion] appeal against a decision addressed to him or against a decision
which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to
another person, is of direct and specific concern to him."'  The latter por-
tion of article 173, paragraph 2, has caused a shift in the court's jur-
isprudence. Previously, this writer has directed criticism against the
treaty makers,4 as well as against particular judgments of the court
deemed too conservative, such as Confederainto Nationale des Produc-
teurs de Fruits et Legumes v. EEC Council' and Fdiration Nationale de
* The writer wishes to acknowledge, with thanks, the invaluable aid received from
numerous persons at the Court of Justice, European Economic Community, Luxem-
bourg, during the past four summers. However, he assumes full responsibility for all
statements. In particular, the following individuals have been especially helpful: Pro-
fessor Dr. Charles Leon Hammes, President, Court of Justice; M. Louis Sizaret and
M. Roger Chevallier, Attaches to Advocate-General Gand; H. Sperl, Head of Docu-
mentation Services, Court of Justice, and M. Grard Rasquin, and M. Van Ketwyck,
Legal Section.
tAssociate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 4 European Yb. 413
(1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community, 4 European Y-b. 455 (1958) [hereinafter cited as EURATOM
Treaty].
2. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 1 European Yb.
353 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty].
3. (Emphasis added.) Article 173, EEC Treaty.
4. GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 148-56 (1966); and Gormley, The Procedural Status
of the Individual Before Supranational Judicial Tribunals, 41 U. DET. L.J. 405, 421-24
(1964).
5. Cases Nos. 16/62 and 17/62, 8 Recueil de la Cour [hereinafter cited as Recueil],
CCH Common Market Reporter 1 8005, at 7181 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CCH
Gormley: Individual Petition to the Commission of the European Economic Co
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1967
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
la Boucherie en Gros et du Commerce en Gros des Viandes v. EEC Coun-
cil.' These decisions, in short, held general regulations could not be chal-
lenged by private persons in associations even though they were indirectly
injured.
Relying on the interpretation given to the superseded article 33,
ECSC, this writer prefers a more flexible approach, while at the same
time conceding certain merits of the court's rulings.7 The problem is es-
sentially that the jurisdiction of the court has been circumvented by the
EEC Treaty. Consequently, the judges are unable to liberalize treaty ar-
ticles as are the constitutional domestic tribunals. Indeed, an attempt to re-
turn to the broader ECSC standard would constitute an abuse of their
judicial function of strictly interpreting the language set forth in the
text.8
The language of article 33, ECSC, also governing the scope of ar-
Common Mkt. Rep.]. See the criticism by GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 150-53 (1966) ; and
Gormley, The Procedural Status of the Individual Before Supranational Judicial Tri-
bunals, 41 U. DET. L.J. 405, 423-24 (1964). On these previous occasions the writer took
the position that the Court interpreted the EEC Treaty in too conservative a fashion
and that the judges should have reached a contrary result, on the theory that the deci-
sions of the Commission were of direct concern to the associations. He is still firmly
of the same opinion.
6. Cases Nos. 19/62, 20/62, 21/62, and 22/62, 8 Recueil 943, CCH Common Mkt.
Rep. ff 8006, at 7192 [hereinafter referred to as F dration Nationale].
7. E.g., Fhd6ration Nationale, supra note 6; Milchwerk Heinz W6hrmann & Sohn,
KG v. EEC Comm., Cases Nos. 31/62 and 33/62, 8 Recueil 965, CCH Common Mkt.
Rep. ff 8007, at 7200 [hereinafter referred to as W6hrmann]. See in particular, Plau-
manm & Company v. EEC Comm., Case No. 25/62, 9 Recueil 197, CCH Common Mkt.
Rep. If 8013, at 7265 [hereinafter cited as Plaumann]. Accord, Socit6 anonyme belge
"Glucoseries rbunies" v. EEC Comm., Case No. 1/64, 10 Recueil 811, CCH Common
Mkt. Rep. If 8024, at 7404; Alfred C. Toepfer KG v. EEC Comm., Cases Nos. 106/63
and 107/63, 11 Recueil 525, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 8031, at 7456; Getreude-Import-
Gesellschaft mbH v. EEC Comm., Case No. 38/64, 11 Recueil 263, CCH Common Mkt.
Rep. 11 8033, at 7484; Marcello Sgarlata v. EEC Comm., Case No. 40/64, 11 Recueil 279,
CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 8034, at 7491.
See especially the discussion by Bebr, Judicial Remedy of Private Parties Against
Normative Acts of the European Communities: The Role of Exception of Illegality, 4
C.M.L. REV. 7-9 (1966).
8. Article 164, EEC Treaty. See 1 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
MON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE 70-72 and 502-05 (Stein & Nicholson eds. 1960) ; FELD,
THE COURT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: NEW DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL AD-
JUDICATION 14-21 (1964) ; LAGRANGE, THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EURO-
PEAN REGIONAL COMMUNITIES 54-71 (Shimm ed. 1962) ; LANG, THE COMMON MARKET
AND THE COMMON LAW 14-20 (1966); 1 VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 17-30 (1965) ; Donner, The Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 17 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 232 (1962) ; Feld, The Judges of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities, 9 VILL. L. REV. 37 (1963) ; P. Herzog, The Pro-
cedure Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 41 WASH. L. REV.
438, 450-53 (1966) ; Mashaw, Federal Issues In and About the Jurisdiction of the Court
of Justice of the European. Communities, 40 TUL. L. REV. 21, 27-36 (1965) ; Note, The
Court of Justice of the European Communitics, 51 IOWA L. REV. 129 (1965).
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ticle 35, to be examined in detail below,9 provided: "The enterprises, or
the associations . . .shall have the right of appeal on the same grounds
against individual decisions and recommendations affecting them, or
against general decisions and recommendations which they deem to in-
volve an abuse of power affecting them."'" The ECSC court, in exis-
tence from 1953 to 1958, had the power to render a broad interpretation
of "affecting them, directly." Moreover, the practice of the ECSC tri-
bunal was to cut the sentence into two separate portions: "[first part]
enterprises, or the associations . . . shall have the right of appeal . . .
against individual decisions and recommendations affecting them, [sec-
ond part] [O]r against general decisions and recommendations which
they deem to involve an abuse of power affecting them." Here, the sen-
tence is cut into two distinct parts in order to permit an enterprise to
challenge "decisions or recommendations of the High Authority" on
either of two grounds: (1) that the decision affected the petitioner
directly, or (2) that petitioner deemed that such general decision or
recommendation affected him directly. But under article 17311 of the
EEC Treaty the second ground for appeal is no longer afforded indi-
viduals. Although member states still may contest an action brought by
another member state, by the council, or by the commission-"on grounds
of lack of jurisdiction, substantial violations of basic procedural rules,
infringements of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to effect be-
ing given to it or of misuse of powers,"-private entities must meet a
more stringent procedural test. The new treaties provide: "Any natural
or legal person may, under the same circumstances, appeal," but in the
case of an individual or enterprise, such violation must be "of direct and
specific concern to him."
Thus, a restriction has been placed upon the right of an individual
9. See infra notes 18, 31, and 46.
10. (Emphasis added.) GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BE-
FORE INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 140-52 (1966).
11. The full text of Article 173, EEC Treaty, reads:
The Court of Justice shall review the lawfulness of acts other than recom-
mendations or opinions of the Council and the Commission. For this purpose,
it shall be competent to give judgment on appeals by a Member State, the
Council or the Commission on grounds of incompetence, of errors of substan-
tial form, of infringement of this Treaty or of any legal provision relating to
its application, or of abuse of power.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, appeal against
a decision addressed to him or against a decision which, although in the form
of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and spe-
cific concern to him.
The appeals provided for in this Article shall be lodged within a period of
two months dating, as the case may be, either from the publication of the act
concerned or from its notification to the appellant or, failing that, from the
day on which the latter had knowledge of that act.
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to initiate an action. The above restrictions contained in article 173 are
mandatory on the court. Specifically, the drafters desired to change the
text of article 33 of the ECSC Treaty in order to stop the Luxembourg
tribunal from interpreting the concept of personal interests or "abuses
affecting them" in such a sweeping manner. Authors of the treaties, as
well as the six ratifying States, intended that the broad interpretation
given by the ECSC court be cut down so that an individual would only
be permitted to appeal an action affecting him personally. Whereas un-
der article 33 of the ECSC Treaty only a general interest and belief had
to be alleged to obtain a hearing, under the EURATOM and ECC
treaties the particular regulation or decision must be "of direct and spe-
cific concern to him" (an individual) at the time an action commences. A
possible future injury does not come within the requirements of article
173 (a result contrary to article 33).
In spite of the desire on the part of writers or statesmen to effect
changes, the establishing treaties are fundamental and, thereby, have the
status of constitutional documents. This principle was articulated in one
of the early cases heard in Luxembourg. 2 The treaty is supreme, with
the effect that the court has no competence to impose treaty revisions.
The ECSC tribunal has held that the basic document-as originally writ-
ten-absolutely binds the judges. Not only are the member states, com-
munity organs, and individuals doing business (within the six) subject
to constitutional-type restrictions, the judges are similarly bound. Un-
questionably, this norm of treaty superiority controls interpretations of
the later EEC Establishing Treaty." Thus the justices properly refrain
from attempts to liberalize the locus standi of private individuals, regard-
less of their sympathy as indicated in their subtle arguments.14 For ex-
12. French Government v. High Authority, ECSC, Case No. 1/54, 1 Recueil 7
(1954). 2 VALENTINE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 18.
13. See especially, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend
& Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, Case No. 26/62, 9 Recueil 1, CCH Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. 8008, at 7207 [hereinafter referred to as Van Gend and Loos]. See
also Kleding-Veroopbedrijf Co. v. Robert Bosch Co., Case No. 13/61, 8 Recueil 89, CCH
Common Mkt. Rep. ff 8003, at 7133 [hereinafter referred to as Bosch case]. Accord, Da
Costa en Schaake N.V. v. Netherlands Fiscal Administration, Cases Nos. 28/62, 29/62,
and 30/62, 9 Recueil 59, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 8010, at 7233 [hereinafter referred
to as Da Costa]. Accord, Flaminio Costa v. Ente nazionale Energia elettrica impresa
giA della Edison Volta, Case No. 6/64, 10 Recueil 1141, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 1 8023,
at 7384 [hereinafter referred to as Costa v. E.N.E.L.]. See Sasse, The Common Mar-
ket: Between International and Municipal Law, 75 YALE L.J. 695 (1966). Erades,
International Law, European Law and Municipal Law of Member States, 15 INT'L &
ComP. L.Q. 117, 120-27 (1966).
14. See the Conclusion of Advocate-General Lagrange in the Plaumann case, supra
note 7, at 7276-81. Cf. his comments as to Article 35, ECSC, id. at 7278. Accord, Ad-
vocate-General Gand in Alfons Lfitticke GmbH, Dr. Otto Suwelack KG, and Kurt
Siemers & Co. v. EEC Comm., Case No. 48/65, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 8044, at
7607 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as Lfitticke].
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ample, Advocate-General Gand, in his conclusion to the Liitticke case,1"
maintained: "regardless of how subtle the suit may be, all of the plain-
tiff's acts from the beginning were intended to force the Commission to
set in motion the procedure of Article 169 against the Federal Republic
of Germany."16  Gand's position accorded with the earlier positions of
Advocate-Generals Karl Roemer" and Maurice Lagrange."
Though condemning the regression in the area of direct appeal, this
writer agrees that required changes cannot be effected by the judges;
rather, the treaty itself must be revised." In this regard, the scope of
article 173(2)-insofar as possible "judicial legislation" is concerned-
has been so firmly delineated that further discussion here would be su-
perfluous. Nevertheless, the judges cannot perform a legislative func-
tion,2" even though the scope of appeal remedies provided for in article
173 (2) is too restrictive to adequately serve a supranational community.
With this appeal limitation imposed by article 173, an alternative
remedy may be found in article 177(2) (which this writer believes is the
15. Lfitticke, supra note 14, at 7597.
16. Id. at 7607. See Article 169, EEC Treaty, infra notes 37, 54-55.
17. Plaumann, supra note 7, at 7276-81. See especially Roemer's discussion of the
earlier Paris Treaty in relation to the later Article 177(2), EEC Treaty, id. at 7276-77.
18. Confhdhration Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Legumes, supra note 5,
at 7189-92. Lagrange states:
An association regularly organized under the national laws to which it is sub-
ject is obviously a "legal person," from the moment it is recognized by such
laws as entitled to such qualification, from which it naturally derives the right
to sue and be sued. It is certain that a strict interpretation of the second para-
graph of Article 173 would result in associations being nearly always denied,
by virtue of this provision, the right to sue, for it is difficult to imagine that a
decision should be directed at an association as such, or that a regulation or
decision directed at another person should "concern it directly and individually"
as an association.
Id. at 7189. Cf. F6dration Nationale, supra note 6. The successful defense raised by
defendant, the EEC Council, alleged:
The defendant maintains that Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, which re-
quires that the act in question be of direct concern to the individuals, is more
restrictive than Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty, which provides in a more
general manner for the right of individuals to attack individual decisions "con-
cerning them." This condition laid down in Article 173 would be met by "a
person for whom the opposed provision creates, modifies or eliminates rights
from which he benefits or obligations for which he is responsible, where, in
short, the effect of the measure on the person concerned is immediate and not
indirect," so that, contrary to what would happen within the framework of the
ECSC Treaty, "this condition is not met when such measure is effective after a
third party's legal act based on the act in question has occurred."
Id. at 7196.
The similarity of this defense with the "law making" pronouncement of Lagrange is
significant, since the correct norm of community law has now been established, when
the force of cases 16/62 and 17/62, supra note 5, are added by way of support.
19. See infra note 93.
20. See supra note 7 and the cases cited therein. See the writer's Recommendations
concerning the required legislative reform, infra note 93.
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best procedural remedy available to individuals). Specifically, paragraph
2 may be termed the indirect right of appeal. Its text--enabling a private
individual to have an issue certified by a municipal forum in order to
obtain a binding judgment from Luxembourg-states: "Where any such
question [involving treaty interpretation] is raised before a court or tri-
bunal of one of the Member States, such court or tribunal may, if it con-
siders that its judgment depends on a preliminary decision on this ques-
tion, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon." Precisely,
article 177(2) permits a lower national tribunal to request a preliminary
decision. Such action, however, is not mandatory. Even so, article
177(2) has afforded opportunities for individuals to have their claims
sent to the EEC tribunal. On the other hand, a more potent provision,
article 177(3), requires referral from the highest courts: "Where any
such question is raised in a case pending before a domestic court or tri-
bunal from whose decisions no, appeal lies under municipal law, such court
or tribunal shall refer the matter to the Court of Justice."
Indeed, the superiority of community law by the use of indirect peti-
tion has been recognized in article 177(3) by a line of cases beginning
with Bosch,21 and culminating in Van Gend and Loos." The court re-
iterated its basic position in Da Costa3 where it resolved differences be-
tween paragraphs 2 and 3 (that is, the mandatory duty, rather than the
option, on the part of a national judge to transfer questions to Luxem-
bourg for interpretation). In short, paragraph 3 contains a mandate
imposed on the highest national forums, and arising simultaneously with
ratification of the treaty. The judges in Da Costa rejected the advice of
their advocate-general and ruled that a national appellate court had an ab-
solute duty to request such an interpretation.
21. Supra note 13.
22. Supra note 13. See especially, Anthony, Comments on the Common Market, 41
WASH. L. REV. 423, 429-31 (1966) and Mashaw, supra note 8, at 37-53.
23. See supra note 13 and the cases cited therein. In this regard, the Court stated:
If the last paragraph of Article 177 unconditionally requires that national
courts-such as the Tariefcommissie-from whose decisions there is no possi-
bility of appeal under domestic law submit to the Court of Justice any ques-
tions of interpretation raised before them, the authoritativeness of its inter-
pretation could nevertheless deprive this obligation of its reason and thus render
it meaningless. This is particularly true when the question raised is substan-
tially similar to one that has already been the object of a preliminary ruling in
a similar case. . . . Article 177 always allows a national court, if it finds it
appropriate, to again refer questions of interpretation to the Court of Justice.
This is made clear in Article 20 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, accord-
ing to which the procedure provided for the settling of pre-judicial questions is
automatically set in motion as soon as such a question is referred by a national
court. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 7238.
Cf. GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 162-64 (1966).
260
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Unlike article 173, article 177 continues to remain a battleground,
for new exceptions to its scope are arising,2 largely because the supra-
national system functions concurrently alongside six national legal struc-
tures. Notwithstanding the usefulness of article 177 in the Bosch, Van
Gend and Loos, and Da Costa cases, the employment of article 177(2)
and (3) remains too limited to compensate for the "down-grading" of
article 173 and the superseding of article 33, ECSC. Nevertheless, under
present jurisdictional standards, article 177 constitutes the only remain-
ing avenue of appeal open to private persons and groups within the six.
As will be shown subsequently, articles 169, 175 and 184 have been in-
effective. Moreover, these exceptional articles have been interpreted
more rigidly than has article 173.25
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
As it became evident that articles 173 and 177 could not afford the
degree of locus standi required by private persons, alternative lines of ap-
peal were sought. An attempt was made to use article 184 2-pursuant to
24. In particular, three exceptions can be cited by way of illustration: 1) where
no doubt exists as to the meaning of the EEC Treaty no interpretation by the court is
required; 2) where it is not necessary to obtain an interpretation of an Article in order
to decide the particular case, no referral is justified; and 3) where the EEC Court has
previously given a decision on the same question there is no duty on the part of a na-
tional forum to again seek the aid of Luxembourg Tribunal.
See F~dration Nationale, supra note 6; W6hrmann, supra note 7; and Da Costa,
supra note 13, for examples of the above three exceptions. At present there exists a
growing problem of concurrent jurisdiction between municipal tribunals and the EEC
Court arising from the application of Article 177. In numerous instances, national
courts need not refer a question to Luxembourg but may render its own interpretation
of the treaties. Blume v. Praag, Belgium Commerce Court, Antwerp. CCH Common
Mkt. Rep. 8017, at 7332; Soci~t6 Arlab Import-Export v. U.N.E.F., Commerce Court
of the Sein, France. CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 1 8018, at 7339; "Cameras," Court of
Appeal, Munich. CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 11 8020, at 7348; and Nicolas v. Photo-Radio
Club, Court of Cassation, Paris. CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 11 8026, at 7421.
This basic norm has been clearly enunciated by the EEC Court. Costa v.
E.N.E.L., supra note 13. Albatros v. SOPECO, Case No. 20/64. 11 Recueil - . CCH
Common Mkt. Rep. 8029, at 7437; Van Der Veen v. Sociale Verzekeringbank, Case
No. 100/63, 10 Recueil 1105, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. V1 8032, at 7472; Dingemans v.
Sociale Verzekeringbank, Case No. 24/64, 10 Recueil 1259, CCH Common Mkt. Rep.
1 8037, at 7525; Firma C. Schwarze v. Einfuhr-und-Vorratsstelle, Case No. 16/65, 11
Recueil 1081, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 8039, at 7548; Dekker v. Bundersversicherungs-
anstalt f ir Angestellte, Case No. 33/65, 11 Recueil 1111, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 1
8043, at 7592; and Soci~t6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case No.
56/65, - Recueil - , CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 1 8047, at 7685.
See also Bebr, supra note 7, at 29-31.
25. FELD, THE COURT OF THE EUROPEAN COIMUNITIES: NEw DIMENSION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 41 and 70-71 (1964). See infra note 39 and the text cited
therein.
26. Where a regulation of the Council or of the Commission is the subject of
a dispute in legal proceedings, any of the parties concerned may, notwithstand-
ing the expiry of the period laid down in Article 173, third paragraph invoke
the grounds set out in Article 173, first paragraph in order to allege before the
Gormley: Individual Petition to the Commission of the European Economic Co
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allegations of inapplicability, or of illegality-as a means of securing a
judicial determination. Sadly, article 184 was interpreted as restrictively
as articles 173 and 177 in the W6hrmann case,27 and the first attempt by
German milk importers to employ an alternative remedy failed. Hence,
article 184 should be conceived as a counterpart to articles 169 and 175
(and 95). Article 184 constitutes a precedent controlling these other
articles.
The specific scope of this present study concerns the feasibility of
an individual petitioning the commission or the council in order that an
executive organ can subsequently take the individual's complaint before
the court in the event a member state has violated a treaty obligation.
Authority for such petition is found in article 175, especially para-
graph 3.
Should the Council or the Commission in violation of this
Treaty fail to act, the Member States and the other institutions
of the Community may refer the matter to the Court of Justice
in order to have the said violation placed on record.
No proceedings arising out of the said reference shall be
heard unless the institution concerned has been called upon to
act. If within two months of being so called upon, the institu-
tion concerned has not made its attitude clear, the said proceed-
ings may be brought within a further period of two months.
Any natural or legal person may bring proceedings before
the Court of Justice, under the conditions laid down in the pre-
Court of Justice that the regulation concerned is inapplicable.
The text of Article 156, EURATOM Treaty, is identical.
27. Supra note 7.
The plaintiffs infer from the fact that Article 184 does not specify the
jurisdiction to which a dispute implicating a regulation must be submitted that
it can be assumed that the inapplicability of this regulation may be invoked
before the Court; that thus would be opened a means of appeal parallel to that
of Article 173.
This, however, is not the meaning of Article 184. Its wording and place-
ment rather suggest that a declaration of inapplicability of a regulation may
be made only by the Court of Justice itself in the course of proceedings involv-
ing some other provision of the Treaty, and then only incidentally and with
limited effect. Above all, it is to be inferred from the reference to the time
limits in Article 173 that Article 184 may be applied only in proceedings before
the Court of Justice, and circumvention of the time limits provided in the
former article will not be allowed. Thus, Article 184 has as its sole object the
protection of those covered against the application of improper regulations,
without, however, calling into question the validity of the regulation itself,
which has now become unassailable through the expiration of the time limits of
Article 173.
Id. at 7203.
But see GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNA-
TIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 153-56 (1966) ; and Bebr, supra note 7, at 29-31.
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ceding paragraphs, on the ground that one of the institutions
of the Community has failed to send him a formal document,
such document not being a recommendation or an opinion.
Accordingly, the possibility still exists that an individual, unable to
utilize the lines of appeal set forth in articles 173 and 177, may be able
to call upon the commission or the council to present his case before the
court in a type of amicus curiae proceeding. This approach was origi-
nally suggested by procedures developed by the Council of Europe where-
in the European Commission of Human Rights has competence to es-
pouse alleged violations of the European Convention of Human Rights
before the Court of Human Rights, a regional court not susceptible to
direct individual petition. The possibility of indirect action was first
suggested by Justice Donner, former president of the EEC Court, in his
1965 Hague Academy lectures."
Unfortunately, the subsequent Liitticke case 9 diminished drastically
the availability of an indirect remedy by applying the norm of: "a deci-
sion affecting the applicant personally," in the same manner as applied
under article 173, discussed below."0 Generally, however, article 175
(along with article 169) should be evaluated within the broader context
of the series of remedies available to individuals, including article 95 ( 1 )
and (3). In short, the specific topic under investigation necessitates
consideration of all exceptional procedures raised in the three cases, and
thus the topic of individual locus standi will be re-examined in light of
the 1966 holdings.
PETITION ON THE GROUND OF INACTION
As a general thesis, the use of article 175 as a means of indirectly
presenting an issue to the court has value-for a limited area of jurisdic-
tion remains, provided the commission or council has previously handed
down a decision.31 Within this context, the remedies examined in this
study must be conceived as being exceptional, rather than representing
28. Donner, Relations between the Competence of the European Communities Court
and Municipal Tribunals, - RECUEIL DES COURS - (1965).
29. Supra note 14, at 7603.
30. Infra note 37 ff.
31. This concept is stated by Gand in Liitticke.
Thus, it is through a formal "call upon the Commission to act," within the
meaning of Article 175, that the proceedings were started. In order to rule on
the plea of inadmissibility, the scope of that article of the Treaty of Rome
must therefore be defined. We will see that the possibilities it affords indi-
dividuals are conspicuously smaller than those provided for under Article 35 of
the Coal and Steel Treaty.
Supra note 14, at 7604.
As to the role of the EEC Commission, see generally Hallstein, The EEC Contmis-
sion: A New Factor it; International Life, 14 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 727, 735 (1965).
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a change in the court's jurisprudence. Considered in favorable light,
these three cases may be held to constitute a marginal area existing on the
fringes of articles 173 and 177. Therefore, the use of an individual
complaint to an executive organ still has considerable latent potential,
even though it has less immediate usefulness than the older remedy for-
merly available under article 35 ECSC Treaty. Indeed, the loss of in-
dividual locus standi was recognized by Gerhard Bebr long before the
Liitticke case.82 In 1962 Professor Bebr equated articles 35 ECSC and
175 EEC, along with articles 33 ECSC and 173 EEC, as one phase in
the overall reduction of the procedural safeguards formerly enjoyed by
private persons and groups. Tragically, Professor Bebr's prophecy
proved all too valid. 3
Since the original use of article 175 was first suggested by Justice
Donner, one further ramification has arisen, namely the need to employ
article 169 to actually bring the alleged offending state within the court's
jurisdiction. Consequently, the rights set forth in article 175 must be
used in conjunction with the sanctioning power inherent within article
169. Regardless of the approach chosen, the basic philosophy of the
EEC Treaty remains unshaken-member states may appeal against gen-
eral recommendations or opinions but private persons may not. That is
to say, under article 175 member states and community organs need not
32. But see BEBR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 121-28
(1962). He very properly draws a sharp distinction between an opinion and a decision.
Concerning the loss of individual locus standi he concludes:
Perhaps the greatest difference between the ECSC Treaty and the Rome
Treaties in this respect, however, appears in reference to the parties which
may appeal inaction. The ECSC Treaty limits this appeal to coal and steel
enterprises and their associations, to Member States and to the Council. Simi-
larly, the Rome Treaties recognize the right of private parties, Member States
and the Council to appeal an inaction of the Commission or the Council, as
the case may be. But in addition even the Commission, the Assembly-and
formally even the Court-may appeal an inaction of the Council and/or Com-
mission. This may be inferred from the explicit language of the first para-
graph of the EEC Treaty, Article 175 (Euratom 148).
Id. at 121.
33. Moreover, the opening passages of Gand's Conclusion illustrate the similarity
of Bebr's position, id. at 121-28, with the later judgment of the Court.
In addition, Article 175, paragraph 3, provides that "any natural or legal
person may bring proceedings before the Court of Justice, under the conditions
laid down in the preceding paragraph, on the ground that one of the institutions
of the Community has failed to send him a formal document, such document not
being a recommendation or an opinion." As a result the main purpose of a
suit for inaction brought by a natural or legal person is to obtain the adoption
of a legal act which, because of its nature and destination, must be directed to
the person requesting it and which can only be a decision. This is what Advo-
cate General Roemer stressed in his conclusions in a similar case, Rhenania
et al., Case No. 103/63 (Recueil Vol. X, page 839), which was non-suited.
Supra note 14, at 7604-05.
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prove an individual or special interest as must private enterprises. 4  Ob-
viously, differing degrees of relief are thereby available to these various
legal entities.3 This writer submits that the basic purpose and fundamen-
tal philosophy of a supranational common. market has been violated." The
present inequality, placing states and community institutions in a favored
category, must be rectified.
RECENT CASE LAW
Liitticke's Use of Articles 169 and 175
The factual situation that gave rise to the use of articles 169"7 and
175 is found in Alfons Liitticke v. EEC Com., s which in turn resulted
from an unsuccessful attempt by plaintiff in the 1962 Wihrmann case.
The important point is that these cases pressed by Liitticke and his asso-
ciates explore the realm of individual protection within the common mar-
ket. Accordingly, the locus standi of private enterprises is now fairly
well fixed and certain insofar as present treaties are concerned. Hence-
forth, private enterprises may accurately determine those instances in
which it will be possible to institute proceedings before the judicial
branch.
34. This same restrictive philosophy can be seen in Article 9, Regulation 17, im-
plementing Articles 85 and 86, EEC Treaty, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. ff 2401, at 1700.
See also PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ARTICLES 85 AND 86 OF THE EEC TREATY AND RELEVANT
REGULATIONS: A MANUAL FOR FIRMS; reprinted CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 2801, at
1961. See particularly, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. ff 2833, at 1979-80. Samkalden &
Druker, Legal Problems Relating to Article 86 of the Rome Treaty, 3 C.M.L. REV. 158,
164-68 (1965).
The same conclusion applies as between Article 175, EEC and Article 3 of Regula-
tion 17. Steindorff, The Right to Request Administrative Action Under EEC Cartel
Law and Its Enforceability; cited in CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 4642.47, at 3841. The
similar effects of Article 35, ECSC, 175 EEC, and Regulation 17 seem to assure that
the basic limitations set forth in 173 will not be liberalized.
Likewise, the same rationale applies to Articles 33 and 35, ECSC. E.g., De Geza-
menlijke Steenkolenm-ijnen in Limburg v. High Authority, ECSC, Case No. 30/59, 7
Recueil 34. Cited in CCH Common Mkt. Rep. J 4646.55, at 3841. See generally, CCH
Common Mkt. Rep. 1 4646, at 3840-41.
35. See Annot., CCH Common Mkt. Rep. ff 4646.
36. Cf. "Conclusions" infra note 93.
37. A major line of precedent setting forth the obligations of member states and
their susceptibility to court action had previously been established. However, the court
chose to limit its decision to a determination of a more limited issue, namely did an in-
fraction actually occur. Oftentimes the court does not decide if the infraction had sub-
sequently been corrected. Hence, prior judgments involving 169 can be distinguished.
E.g., EEC Comm. v. Italy, Case No. 7/61, 7 Recueil 633, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 1
8001, at 7103; EEC Comm. v. Luxembourg and Belgium, Cases Nos. 2/62 and 3/62, 8
Recueil 813, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. J 8004, at 7166; EEC Comm. v. Luxembourg and
Belgium, Cases Nos. 90/63 and 91/63, 10 Recueil 1217, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 1 8028,
at 7423-2; and EEC Comm. v. Italy, Case No. 45/64, 11 Recueil 1057, CCH Common
Mkt. Rep. f1 8038, at 7536. See infra note 72 and the cases cited therein.
38. Supra note 14.
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In the 1962 action wherein articles; 173, 177 and 184 were employed
by the same plaintiff, the court-in its landmark W6hrmtnn verdict-
enunciated the limited procedural rights accorded individuals. In short,
only an executive decision personally affecting a private enterprise di-
rectly, will provide grounds for judicial review. 9 Undaunted, plaintiffs
sought a new line of attack on the theory the EEC Commission was guilty
of inaction arising from the following situation. The plaintiffs (in these
three cases) 4" specialized in the importation of powdered and dried milk
products into Western Germany. The majority of these goods originated
from France, Belgium and the Netherlands. The dispute with the West
German Government arose from the imposition of a turn-over equaliza-
tion tax on the import of their milk products. Such tax had been in ef-
fect since January 1, 1962. Plaintiff contended this tax violated the
EEC Treaty, to which all municipal laws must yield." Accordingly, sev-
eral informal letters were sent to the commission between December
1962 and July 1963.
The commission, however, did not take the desired action, namely a
proceeding against the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, a
formal request pursuant to article 175(2) was sent to the commission in
the form of a letter.2 A declaration was sought specifically declaring the
four per cent turnover equalization tax a violation of the ban against dis-
crimination contained in article 95 of the treaty.4" It was demanded
39. Supra note 11. Bebr, Judicial Remedy of Private Parties Against Normative
Acts of the European Communities: The Role of Exception of Illegality, 4 C.M.L. REv.
7-9 (1966); Gormley, The Procedural Status of the Individual Before Supranational
Judicial Tribunals, 41 U. DET. L.J. 405, 421-24 (1964) ; Sasse, supra note 13.
40. W6hrmann, supra note 7; and Firma Alfons Litticke v. Hauptzollamt Saar-
louis, Case No. 57/65, - Recueil -, CCII Common Mkt. Rep. 1 8045, at 7608 (June
16, 1966) [hereinafter referred to as Second Lfitticke]. See especially, Luitticke, supra
note 14, at 7598, for the factual background of the cases.
41. Cf. Van Gend and Loos, and Bosch cases, and Costa v. E.N.E.L., supra note 13.
42. In this letter, which the Commission received on March 17, 1965, the plain-
tiffs' attorney requested that the Commission:
(1) Adopt a decision under Article 175, paragraph 1, of the EEC Treaty,
declaring that since January 1, 1962, the imposition by the Federal Republic of
Germany of a four percent turnover equalization tax on imports of powdered
milk and other dried milk products . . . was a violation of the ban on discrim-
ination contained in Article 95 of the Treaty;
(2) Decide to open proceedings under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty
against the Federal Republic of Germany for the purpose of removing the
turnover equalization tax on the products described in item (1) for the period
beginning January 1, 1962, give the Federal Republic of Germany an oppor-
tunity to submit its comments, and proceed under Article 169, paragraph 2, if
it does not comply with the opinion of the Commission within the proper
period of time;
(3) Inform my clients of the decisions requested in items (1) and (2).
Liitticke, supra note 14, at 7599. Cf. Gand's analysis of the Letter, id. at 7604.
43. A Member State shall not impose, directly or indirectly, on the products
of other Member States any internal charges of any kind in excess of those
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further that the commission institgate judicial proceedings against the
German Government under article 169 for the purpose of removing the
turnover tax on their products for the entire period following January 1,
1962, the date on which the EEC entered into its Second Phase. This
date, therefore, constitutes the turning point in this study due to the new
community obligations to be implemented by the six member states.
Nevertheless, a stumbling block arose when Litticke attempted to com-
pel the German State to fulfill these obligations.
Under the theory advanced by plaintiffs, if German authorities did
not comply with a commission request to remove the tax, then steps
should be taken under authority of article 169(2). Subsequently, the
commission did take steps, resulting in a reduction in the turnover tax
from four to three per cent, effective April 1, 1965. The commission,
however, "decided not to insist that the Federal Republic of Germany
reduce the tax retroactive to January 1, 1962."" 4
In brief, the substantive issue became: Does the failure by the com-
mission to correct the "violation" back to January 1, 1962 (the beginning
of the Second Phase), constitute inaction; or, alternatively, did the re-
duction of the tax after April 1, 1965, terminate any violation of ar-
ticle 95 ? Interestingly, similar disputes are common in American ad-
ministrative law.45
The main issue in Liitticke is an alleged failure to act, whereas in the
earlier Wihrmann and Plaumann adjudications, interpreting articles 173
and 184, actions of the community were challenged as being illegal. 6
The defense interposed by the German Government maintained that
the letter sent by the commission "is not a decision within the meaning
of Article 173, paragraph 2, and of Article 189, paragraph 4, of the EEC
Treaty and cannot, therefore, be the subject of a suit for annulment.""7
This submission was accepted by both the court and Advocate-General
Gand. The tribunal held that the commission's communication could not
be subjected to a suit for annulment. "No measure adopted by the Corn-
applied directly or indirectly to like domestic products.
Furthermore, a Member State shall not impose on the products of other
Member States any internal charges of such a nature as to afford indirect pro-
tection to other productions.
Member States shall, not later than at the beginning of the second stage,
abolish or amend any provisions existing at the date of the entry into force of
this Treaty which are contrary to the above rules.
44. Litticke, supra note 14, at 7599.
45. E.g., DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 16.01-16.14, 292-325 (1959).
46. See Annot., CCH Common Mkt. Rep. I 4646, at 3837. See also id. at 3840-41
for a discussion of Article 35, ECSC Treaty, as applicable under the concept of failure
to act, and the older ECSC cases cited therein.
47. Liitticke, supra note 14, at 7599.
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mission in this phase of the proceedings has binding effect."48  Specific-
ally, article 175 could not be used as a ground for relief because of com-
pliance by the commission with the two-month time limit contained in
article 175 (2). On prior occasions, this writer has criticized the severe
"statutes of limitations" applicable to articles 173 and 184 (and also the
six-month period permitted for appeals to the Court of Human Rights,
Council of Europe)." Because articles 173 and 175 are counterpart pro-
visions, the same two-month time period-during which the action must
be brought-controls. No extension can be expected. As the court stated:
Under Article 175, paragraph 2, suits for inaction are admis-
sible only when the institution has not taken a position within
two months from the date on which it was called upon to act. It
has been established that the Commission took a position and
sent notice of it to the plaintiffs within such time-limit. The
plea of inadmissibility, therefore, has merit."
The rationale of this holding is that there was no further legal duty
on the part of the commission to act. The commission had already ful-
filled its obligations under the Treaty and had functioned properly as a
matter of law. Procedurally, plaintiffs had submitted a request in the
form of a letter."'
This ruling means that henceforth, an individual may only file a
claim for inaction if the commission has: (1) failed to take any form of
action; and (2) refused to send any document (or communication). Thus,
it appears that articles 169 and 175 have been interpreted more restric-
tively than has article 173.
48. Id. at 7603.
49. GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 167-68 (1966). As to the Council of Europe, see id. at
96-100. "The writer believes that a change should be made in the wording of Article
26 [European Convention of Human Rights] in order to provide a more realistic time
period. Admittedly, the Commission [of Human Rights] is protecting States to a greater
degree than individuals." Id. at 98. Gormley, The Procedural Status of the Individual
Before Supranational Judicial Tribunals, 41 U. DET. L.J. 405, 430-31 (1964). As to the
Council of Europe see id. at 319-22.
50. Liitticke, supra note 14, at 7603. A similar stand was taken by the Advocate-
General on the ground that the earlier ECSC criterion had been curtailed.
The fact that Article 175, paragraph 3, thus precludes the possibility for
an individual to bring a suit for inaction because of a failure to apply the pro-
cedure provided for in Article 169 against a Member State is not accidental,
but was intended by the drafters of the Treaty to exclude for individuals the
right they had under the combined provisions of Articles 33, 35, and 88 of the
Coal and Steel Treaty. Any interpretation that might lead you to follow your
earlier decisions within the framework of the Treaty of Rome would certainly
be contrary not only to its provisions but to the intent of its authors as well.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 7605.
51. See Gand's discussion of the legal effect of plaintiffs' Letter, id. at 7598.
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The right of individual petition is further complicated by the need
to employ article 175 in connection with article 169. In fact, the court
must necessarily treat these two articles as a single legal concept for the
reason article 175 can afford some basis for relief within the two-month
period, provided a decision addressed directly to individuals is present.
On the other hand, article 169 may afford the commission the competence
required to institute legal proceedings against a member state in the
event a treaty violation exists. Indeed, the merging of these two articles
into a single legal entity has the effect of further restricting the locus
standi of individuals."
As Gand surmised, the basic philosophy of article 173 (and 175 to
force the commission to activate article 169 procedure) is unmistakably
clear. Plaintiff's dialectic skill cannot defeat the German defense."
Simply, an informal letter from the commission does not constitute a
decision. The primary purpose of article 169 is to afford a means of
settling disputes between the commission and member states, and such
a ruling will bind the state and require implementing action in the event
that the Establishing Treaty has been violated." The absolute duty to
implement judicial decisions arising from article 175 proceedings is found
in article 176(1). Unfortunately, individuals, pursuant to article 175,
cannot activate article 169 procedures; they have no right to demand ac-
tion from the council or commission. Furthermore, the letter in ques-
tion has "no legal effect on the persons to whom it is addressed, who
have no right to demand that the Conmission set in motion the procedure
provided for in Article 169."" 5 Different standards apply as between
private enterprises, states, and the EEC."'
52. In connection with Article 171, EEC, imposing an obligation on member states
to "take the measures required for the implementation of the judgment of the Court,"
in the words of Article 171.
53. LUtticke, supra note 14, at 7605.
54. Ibid. Furthermore Gand holds, as to the procedure pursuant to Article 169:
In contrast, under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty, the Commission may
not find, in a binding legal act, that a Member State has violated the Treaty.
It may only refer this to you, following a procedure whose principal step is the
publication of the reasoned opinion. Before issuance of this reasoned opinion,
the State concerned must have been given an opportunity to submit its com-
ments. The measures provided for in Article 169 therefore provide a procedure
designed to settle a dispute between the Commission and a Member State . . .
[Commission opinions] are in no case directed to the person who has requested
the Commission to take action.
Id. at 7605.
55. Id. at 7606. Gand in his last two pages, id. at 7606-07, presents the best (and
most scholarly) discussion of the status of states, community organs, and individuals.
Accord, 1 VALENTINE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 274-77. Cf. Soci6t6 des Usines A Tubes
de la Sarre v. High Authority, Cases Nos. 1/57 and 14/57; cited id. at 275 n.30.
56. What is certain is the fact that while the other Member States may, in-
directly through Article 170, oblige the Commission to issue a reasoned opinion
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By way of comparison, article 88, ECSC, formerly afforded a
broader basis for relief, because its scope was determined by article 33.
As is true of article 33 ECSC and article 173 EEC, articles 88 ECSC and
169 EEC contain differing individual safeguards. Precisely, article 169
is more restrictive than the earlier article 88. These two provisions (and
also articles 35 ECSC and 175 EEC) must be harmonized and liberalized
at such time as the three executives are merged. As the following discus-
sion indicates, the judges are bound strictly by treaty provisions and have
no means of accomplishing the needed changes.
Advocate-General Gand articulates this legal norm of community
law:
All this leads us to the conclusion that when the Commis-
sion refuses to comply with a request to set in motion the pro-
cedure provided for in Article 169 it is not adopting a decision
that can be contested under Article 173, paragraph 2. True,
this was not the sole object of the letter sent in the name of the
plaintiffs, who had also wished to be informed of the action
taken on their principal request. The letter they are contesting
is, in this respect, an answer to their requests, but it cannot be
appealed. Here we can only repeat the words of the Advocate
General in Case No. 103/63, when he said that notice of acts of
this type "is only a secondary adjunct, a reflection of the act
proper, having no legal content of its own," which, therefore,
is subject to the same legal treatment.5 7
The result is obvious; a severe blow seems to have been dealt indi-
vidual procedural status. Such a conservative standard is, however, in-
consistent with the fundamental aims and purposes of a true Common
Market, as compared with the standard advocated in subsequent recom-
mendations.58  Tragically, only member states-but not individuals--can
force the court to examine substantive issues, unless a decision has been
rendered.5 9 In sum, the council and commission have a legal duty to insti-
tute proceedings in the event a member state violates treaty obligations.
But only another member state can demand action; a private individual
on an alleged failure on the part of a State under conditions somewhat similar
to those of Article 169, natural or legal persons, in contrast, are afforded no
avenue of this nature. . . Here again they [plaintiffs] fail to understand
that express rules permit a complaint for failure on the part of a Member
State to be brought to the Court only by the Commission on the basis of Article
169 or by another Member State on the basis of Article 170.
Lftticke, supra note 14, at 7606.
57. Ibid.
58. See infra note 88.
59. Liitticke, supra note 14, at 7607 and 7601.
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does not possess a corresponding right, even though he has been injured
by illegal action or inaction.
A possible solution is offered to the above dilemma: Illegality or in-
action should be considered to constitute an existing fact. In this event,
individual consequences resulting from community regulations would be
recognized. Thus, the court could take "judicial notice" of factual con-
sequences for the sole purpose of assuming jurisdiction. This proposed
solution can be compared against present cases. In the Plkumann, W6hr-
mann, and Liitticke cases, plaintiffs argued they lost money because of
complying with community regulations (or the failure of their govern-
ment to conform with such regulations). Regrettably, the court did not
examine these claims, and thus was not able to determine whether or not
any illegal action, or lack of action, had in fact taken place. Certainly,
the German equalization tax-in relation to plaintiff's losses-is a fact
capable of examination. Under current practice, however, the final de-
termination cannot be made, except through the indirect approach avail-
able pursuant to article 177.
Interestingly, Gand moved beyond the scope of the instant case, and
in his last paragraph advised defeated plaintiffs that an additional course
of action remained, namely a referral from a German national court
under article 177, previously herein designated as the best procedural
remedy available to private persons and non-governmental entities.6"
Consequently, Gand made specific reference to the second Liitticke case-
Firma Alfons Liitticke v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis,6 ' still pending at the
time of the first judgment. By resorting to article 177, EEC, plaintiffs
were not deprived of all legal protection. Realistically, the second
Liitticke case reached a more favorable result, although Liitticke still did
not receive a full examination of his claim.62
60. Supra notes 23 and 24; GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 148-56 (1966); Gormley,
The Procedural Status of the Individual Before Supranational Judicial Tribunals, 41 U.
DET. L.J. 405, 424-26 (1964).
61. Second Liitticke, supra note 40; LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND THE COM-
MON LAw 20-26 (1966).
62. A careful reading of Gand's Conclusion indicates the possibility of even a
fourth action by Litticke through the use of 177.
[W]hile the avenue offered by Article 169 is closed to individuals because the
authors of the Treaty wanted it so, the plaintiffs are not necessarily deprived
of all legal protection, since they can resort to Article 177. This is not purely
theoretical protection, as proved by Case No. 57/65, which, in a referral by
the Fiscal Court of Saarbruicken, raises the question of the direct application
of Article 95 of the Treaty. (Emphasis added.)
Lutticke, supra note 14, at 7607.
However, a very lengthy discussion was raised by Germany in its defensive plead-
ing. See id. at 7602. But, plaintiffs correctly detect the weaknesses of this stand, plus
the inherent limitations of 177.
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LtOTTICKE'S SUBSEQUENT USE OF ARTICLE 177
Not only were articles 169 and 175 controlled by article 173, but a
similar fate awaited article 95. Though article 177 affords the pro-
cedural remedy by which the German Fiscal Court of Saarbrilcken can
request a preliminary decision, no substantive rights are set forth in the
language of article 177. Therefore, if a treaty violation is to be alleged,
article 95 (1) and (3) must be applicable. Article 95 (1) provides: "A
Member State shall not impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of
other Member States any internal charges of any kind in excess of those
applied directly or indirectly to similar domestic products." More spe-
cifically, article 95(3) commands: "Member States shall, not later than
at the beginning of the Second Stage, eliminate or amend any provisions
existing when this Treaty comes into force which conflict with the above
rules." Obviously, article 95(3) becomes the important provision re-
garding the equalization tax imposed after January 1, 1962. The lan-
guage of the above paragraph seems clear; yet a further point had to be
resolved: Does article 95(3) impose a duty only on member states or
may individuals also benefit?
Before considering the inapplicability to individuals of article 95,
the present stage of the emerging European Community is first ex-
amined. A fully developed Common Market has not been achieved; in-
stead, the EEC is in the process of emerging from the First into the
Second Stage, the Second Stage having commenced on January 1, 1962,
the key date in both Liitticke judgments. Thus, individual rights stem-
ming from article 95 (1) and (3) became effective on that date, and no
equalization tax may be levied after January 1, 1962. On the other hand,
it is invalid to assume that no true common market exists presently.
On one extreme, the EEC has been erroneously conceived as a matured
federal structure; but equally fallacious is the view that the three com-
mon markets-insofar as the procedural rights of sovereign states are
concerned-are not supranational entities.6" Rather, the EEC is still in
the process of development, despite the efforts of President de Gaulle to
prevent the organization from achieving a single agricultural policy.
Likewise, the developmental nature of the EEC may be illustrated by the
current difficulty of obtaining ratification of the Protocol, merging the
This German procedure would be too lengthy and time-consuming to have the
effects the authors of Article 177 had expected of that article. Under Article
177, the Court of Justice has the opportunity only after five or ten years have
elapsed to rule on a violation of the Treaty by a Member State. It is then
too late to still eradicate completely the effects of such violation.
Id. at 7602.
63. See the discussion of supranational, infra note 88.
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EEC and EURATOM Commissions and the ECSC High Authority in-
to a single executive branch-an organ intended to serve all three com-
munities. Without doubt, such ratification eventually will take place.
Nevertheless, in its present embryonic stage, the EEC is unable to adhere
to consistent policy in all areas. For example, the agricultural regime
within the Six will undergo major changes during the coming decade.
Similarly, antitrust measures will be viewed differently at a future time.64
Against this conflicting sphere of interests, in terms of the power
retained by national governments as it clashes with supranational au-
thority, the delicate role of the court must be appreciated. An even more
striking illustration of this role can be seen from the large number of
cases involving treaty issues decided by national courts. In view of the
fact that only the highest municipal forums are required to refer ques-
tions of treaty interpretation to Luxembourg, a great many lower tri-
bunals are interpreting treaty law, with the effect the corpus of com-
munity law is becoming decentralized-a result disturbing to this writer
who believes a supranational community must be superior to and free
from national interference. Yet, a higher degree of centralization must
await a more advanced stage of integration. In other words, until a ma-
ture common market has become a reality, disputes of concurrent juris-
diction will continually arise, as evidenced by the line of cases involving
article 177 in which the proper spheres of municipal law and community
law had to be resolved.65 In short, the EEC tribunal cannot be compared
with national supreme courts. Nor is it realistic to view the tribunal as
a true federal court.6"
Plaintiffs in Wihrann and the two subsequent Liitticke cases
64. E.g., Regulation 17, supra note 34, which administrative act is in accord with
Articles 173, 169, 175, and even Article 95, in that the member states have been placed in
a favored position by curtailing Articles 33, 35, and 88, ECSC. See also Etablissements
Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Comm., Cases Nos. 56/64 and 58/64,
- Recueil - , CCH Common Mkt. Rep. ff 8046, at 7618 (July 13, 1966); Italy v.
EEC Comm., Case No. 32/65, - Recueil - , CCH Common Mkt. Rep. t 8048, at 7704
(July 13, 1966).
65. See supra notes 13, 21-24 and the cases cited therein. See also the later pro-
nouncement of this basic position. Hessische Knappschaft v. Maison Singer et Files,
Case No. 44/65, - Recueil -, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 1 8042, at 7582 (Dec. 9,
1965). In brief, the Court held that Article 184 cannot be incorporated into Article 177;
therefore, individuals cannot request an interpretation. It is for the national judge-
alone--and not the parties to make such a request. LANG, op. cit. supra note 61, at 16-19.
66. 1 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PRO-
FILE 70-71 and 502-05 (Stein & Nicholson eds. 1960) ; Bebr, The Development of a Com-
munity Law by the Court of the European Coal and Steel Community, 42 MINN. L. REv.
845 (1958) ; Cohn, Aspects of the Procedure Before the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities, 1 SOL. 309 (1962) ; Gormley, The Significant Role of French Admin-
istrative Jurisprudence as Presently Applied by the Court of the European Communities,
With Emphasis on the Administrative Law Remedies Available to Private Parties, 8
S.D.L. REv. 32, 53-55 (1963).
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could not get around one obstacle-the sizeable residual of power re-
tained by the member states. Accordingly, it follows that equal pro-
cedural rights can become a reality only at a later stage of supernational
development.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 95
Article 177 has enabled the German court to request an opinion
relative to the applicability of articles 95 ( 1 ) and (3) in connection with
articles 12 and 13. The controversey focuses upon three questions sent
from the Saar tribunal to Luxembourg as follows:
(1) Does Article 95, paragraph 1, of the EEC Treaty
produce direct effects and create personal rights for individuals
which the national courts must recognize?
(2) If the first question is answered in the negative,
does Article 95, paragraph 3, of the EEC Treaty, in conjunc-
tion with Article 95, paragraph 1, of the EEC Treaty, produce
direct effects and create personal rights for individuals which
the national courts must recognize?
(3) If the second question is also answered in the nega-
tive, does Article 95, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the EEC Treaty,
in conjunction with Article 12 or Article 13 of the EEC Treaty,
produce direct effects and create personal rights for individuals
which the national courts must recognize ?6"
The first two issues-paragraphs one and three (of article 95)-
were answered in the negative, with the result that at "first impression"
article 95 appeared doomed to follow articles 173, 169, and 175. Never-
theless, exceptional circumstances arise when articles 95 (1) and (3) are
used in conjunction with articles 12 and 13, because the date January 1,
1962 (the beginning of the Second Stage) sets in motion "the rules
mentioned in Article 14."68 In the instant litigation, the court looked to
the basic prohibition-ignored in the first Liitticke case-and held that
member states must refrain from introducing new customs duties on im-
portation or exportation; moreover, that they must refrain from increas-
ing existing duties or any type of charges affecting other member states.
Therefore, the basic prohibition imposed on member governments which
benefit individuals is unmistakably set forth. Furthermore, article 13
imposes an additional duty on states to abolish existing customs duties,
67. Second Liitticke, supra note 40, at 7609.
68. Article 13(2), in part, EEC Treaty, referring to the lengthy text of Article 14.
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during the transitional period. 9
As is often the case with community law, several articles must be em-
ployed as a single legal concept to achieve a desired goal. Regretfully,
treaty articles do not stand alone; consequently, the precise legal prece-
dent set forth in any particular judgment seems open to later re-
examination. To illustrate, article 95 places obligations primarily on
governments (as is usually true in public international law), 7" but not
directly on individuals. Still, further analysis seems appropriate since
the prohibition against discrimination is addressed to member states.
Nevertheless, this limitation does not mean that individuals cannot
benefit-directly. Henceforth, the individual may arise as a beneficiary
of community law in situations where he may not be a full sui juris sub-
ject of the legal order.71 This result has been recognized by Advocate-
General Gand, as being consistent with the scheme of the EEC treaty."2
The basic obligation superimposed (as set forth in the third para-
graph)-and the important consideration-is that national courts must
69. Article 13 provides:
1. Customs duties on importation in force between Member States shall
be progressively abolished by them in the course of the transitional period
under the conditions laid down in Articles 14 and 15.
2. Charges in force between Member States having an effect equivalent
to customs duties on importation shall be progressively abolished by them in
the course of the transitional period. The Commission shall, by means of
directives, fix the timing of such abolition ...
70. In regard to a more typical public law-type interpretation, Plaintiffs offered
the following analysis as to the issue of precedence of community law over national law.
As for the question of whether Article 95 creates personal rights for in-
dividuals which the national courts must recognize, the plaintiff feels that the
"self-executing" concept should be avoided as being unsuitable. It suggests
that a distinction be made, as in Roman law, between leges imperfectae, leges
minus quam perfecae, leges perfectae, and leges plus quam perfectae. It alleges
that since all of the Treaty provisions are leges perfectae, they have the direct
effect in issue here. Article 95 is such a lex perfecta. The plaintiff then
undertakes to refute the arguments that led the Finanzgericht to an opposite
conclusion.
Second Liitticke, supra note 40, at 7610.
71. Under present theories of international law, private persons are deemed to be
either subjects, objects, or 'beneficiaries of the legal order. From the standpoint of com-
munity law, individuals and non-governmental entities are deemed to be subjects of the
law; however, pursuant to Article 95 they can also benefit, even though the text is not
addressed directly to them. As to the various theories of individual procedural standing
see GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL AND
SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 23-32 (1966) ; NORGAARD, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-78 (1962) ; REMEc, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING To GROTIUS AND VATTEL (1960); Gormley, An Analysis
of the Future Procedural Status of the Individual Before International Tribunals, 39 U.
DEr. L.J. 33 (1961).
72. Second Liitticke, Gand's Conclusion, supra note 40, at 7614-17, in which prior
cases are distinguished. Cf. Firma Waldemar Deutschmann, Case No. 10/65, 11 Recueil
601, CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 8035, at 7506, cited by Gand, id. at 7617. See also EEC
Comm. v. Luxembourg and Belgium, Cases Nos. 2/62 and 3/62, 8 Recueil 813, CCH
Common Mkt. Rep. V 8004, at 7166. See supra note 37 and the cases cited therein.
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enforce "private benefits" because no discretion remains available to na-
tional authorities subsequent to January 1, 1962. Article 95 (3) "creates
for the Member States, not an obligation to refrain from acting, but an
obligation to act,""3 according to Gand. This positive duty, arising with
the second stages must be enforced by national forums7" rather than the
EEC Tribunal.7" Thus, self-executing provisions are present. No fur-
ther implementation by national legislation is required, as was stressed
by Gand."s
At this point an unanswered question remains: What practical re-
lief has been secured? True, a pronouncement from the EEC Court has
been obtained, which judgment must be implemented by the German
Government because of article 176."7 The Luxembourg tribunal, how-
ever, has been unable to resolve the basic controversy submitted to it on
three different occasions. These three cases have established one funda-
mental fact of life-the only effective course of action remaining is to be
found in article 177. The curtailment of other articles has increased the
stature of article 177, despite its obvious weaknesses. Although a review
of German tax law was obtained, a full examination of plaintiffs' claims
could not be secured since the national court decides which issues shall be
certified to Luxembourg. No, corresponding authority is possessed by
individuals or groups. This fundamental limitation had been clearly
enunciated as early as December 15, 1965. Article 184 could not be in-
73. Second Liitticke, supra note 40, at 7617.
74. Ibid.
75. The most important passage in the Court's opinion holds:
Article 95, paragraph 1, contains a prohibition against discrimination that
creates a clear and unconditional duty. Apart from paragraph 3, there is no
condition attached to this duty; no further measures on the part either of the
Community or of the Member States are necessary to implement it or to give it
effect. The prohibition is therefore complete, legally perfect, and can thus
produce direct effects in legal relations between Member States and the per-
sons subject to their laws. The fact that the prohibition against discrimination
is addressed to the Member States does not mean that individuals cannot benefit
by it.
As for paragraph 3 of Article 95, it does, in fact, create a duty for the
Member States to "suspend" or "amend" the provisions that are contrary to
the rules set forth in the preceding paragraphs. This duty, however, allows the
Member States no margin of discretion as to the deadline-January 1, 1962 'by
which such measures must have been taken. After that date, in order to be
able to apply paragraph 1 directly, the national courts need only find, in a
given case, that the act implementing the internal provisions in issue were
adopted after January 1, 1962 .... (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 7611.
76. Though the court slights this vital question of self-executing provisions, Gand
very properly takes an affirmative stand. Id. at 7615-16.
77. "An institution originating an act subsequently declared null and void or an
institution whose failure to act has been declared contrary to the provisions of this
Treaty shall take the measures required for the implementation of the judgment of the
Court of Justice."
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corporated into article 177.
In Hessische Knappschaft v. Maison Singer et Fils,7s the court held:
[I]t is for the national court, and not for the parties in the
action pending before it, to refer to the Court of Justice. Con-
sequently, only the national court has the power to decide what
questions are to be submitted to the Court of Justice. The
parties may not change their context or have them declared
moot."9
Interestingly, an identical point was raised in the first Liitticke case.8"
The German Government contended, as a matter of strategy, that article
177 was in fact the correct remedy. Despite this sophistry, it seems clear
that article 177(3) cannot fill procedural gaps in community law caused
by the restriction of articles 173, 169, 175, and 184. One additional
"regression" not very clearly set forth in the short opinion-and likewise
ignored by Gand-is the "distinguishing" of an internal tax vis-A-vis a
customs duty. In the second Liitticke case, the court held that each of
78. Supra note 65.
79. Case No. 44/65, - Recueil - , CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 1 8042, 7582, at
7585 (Dec. 9, 1965).
The Court of Justice, therefore, cannot be compelled, within the special
procedure of Article 177, to concern itself, on the request of one of the parties,
with a question that should be submitted not by the parties but by the national
court itself, or with a motion based on Article 184. Furthermore, a contrary
view is based on a failure to recognize that the drafters of Article 177 intended
to establish a direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national
courts in non-adversary proceedings, in which the parties have no right of
initiative and in the course of which they are merely invited to submit comments.
Ibid.
Accord, Bebr, Judicial Remedy of Private Parties Against Normative Acts of the
European Communities: The Role of Exception of Illegality, 4 C.M.L. REv. 29-31
(1966). He concludes that only national judges have the competence to formulate is-
sues. "[P]rivate parties may not in their written observations go beyond the questions
as formulated by the national court." Id. at 31.
80. See note 62 supra and the text cited therein. A similar conclusion is reached
by Bebr, supra note 79, at 31.
Were the procedure of the E.E.C. Treaty Article 177 really meant as a
judicial remedy for private parties, as it is sometimes maintained, would it not
be logical if private parties could advance their own additional charges of
nonvalidity of a Community act, independently of the questions as formulated
by the national court? But nothing of the sort. The fact that it is the na-
tional court which formulates the preliminary questions and that the parties are
limited in their written observations by them demonstrates that this is an ob-
jective Community control instituted as a Community constitutional control.
The fact that a private party nay eventually benefit from a preliminary ruling
of the Court of Justice nay not change the objective purpose of the procedure
of Article 177. Merely because private parties may draw a possible benefit
from a preliminary ruling this alone is not a sufficient ground for assimilating
the procedure of Article 177 to an exception of illegality. (Emphasis added.)
Obviously, the writer wishes that the EEC Court and Professor Bebr had reached
contrary results.
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these two areas is governed by completely different rules. The practical
effect of this holding is that Van Gend and Loos has been restricted.
Theoretically, community law prevails over municipal legislation, but the
scope of EEC superiority has been curtailed in favor of state compe-
tence. Articles 12 and 13 cannot be applied to the same factual situation,
or in the same manner, as article 95. In other words, internal taxes,
whose purpose is to equalize domestic levels, cannot be treated the same
as a customs duty (or an internal tax having the effect of a customs
duty). In the second case, the Court decided the tax in question was
merely designed to equalize. Unfortunately, no further explanation was
provided, nor was any comparison with prior rulings in Bosch or Van
Gend and Loos given. Nevertheless, the rule of community superiority
will undergo further limitation. The full impact of this trend cannot be
accurately predicted.
Additional authority supports the above conclusions. In Etablisse-
ments Consten and Grundig-Verkauls GmbH v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Economic Community,"' decided July 13, 1966, the Court held that
article 85(1)2 cannot be employed to attack a general regulation of the
commission.8" A general directive from the commission cannot be ad-
dressed to individuals so as to constitute a decision. 4 Furthermore, an-
81. Cases Nos. 56/64 and 58/64, - Recueil - , CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 1
8046, at 7618. See especially the discussion by Ebb, Common Market Law in Process:
The Grundig Case and the Interplay Between National Law and Treaty Law, 41 WAsH.
L. REv. 489 (1966). See generally, Dekeyser, Territorial Restrictions and Export Pro-
hibitions Under the United States and the Common Market Antitrust Law, 2 C.M.L.
REv. 271 (1964).
82. The key portion of Article 85(1) provides:
The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Mar-
ket and shall hereby be prohibited: Any agreement between enterprises, any
decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are
likely to affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
Common Market ...
83. The court reached a similar result as to Article 19 of Regulation 17, supra note
34, at 1713. Individual third parties, though affected by the Commission's action, had
no right to demand a hearing. See also Roemer's Conclusion in Consten and Grundig
case, supra note 81, at 7660, in which reference is made to the Bosch case, discussed
supra note 21 and accompanying text. See also Roemer's further analysis id. at 7673, and
7682-83. Regretfully, in this very rare instance, the court did not follow the advice of
its Advocate General, which action further indicates the conservative nature of the
court's jurisprudence.
84. Id. at 7650. The Court said:
It is generally desirable for the Commission to extend its inquiries as far
as possible to all persons who may be affected by its decisions. However, an
interest on the part of Grundig's other dealers in the legal validity of agree-
ments between Consten and Grundig, to which they are not parties but which
actually work to their advantage, could not furnish them grounds to claim an
automatic right to be invited to the proceedings which the Commission opened
with respect to such agreements. This plea, therefore, is without merit.
Id. at 7655.
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other July 13, 1966 holding, Republic of Italy v. Council and Commission
of the European Economic Communit3? reached a similar result as to
articles 85, 86, 87, and 184. This later case again re-inforced the basic
rule: individuals may only contest illegal actions of direct concern to
them. The court repeatedly has maintained that article 173 controls these
exceptional procedures. 6  The court declared:
Under Article 184, any of the parties to a dispute involv-
ing the validity of a regulation may invoke the inapplicability of
that regulation on the grounds described in Article 173, para-
graph 1. It is not the purpose of that provision to enable a
party to contest the applicability of any regulation by means of
any suit whatever. The regulation claimed to be illegal must be
directly or indirectly applicable to the situation that is the sub-
ject of the suit.87
CONCLUSIONS
The three principal cases examined have dealt with the various treaty
provisions outlining individual procedural rights. Yet, except for the use
of article 177 in the second Liitticke case, little relief has been obtained-
aside from a pronouncement on the applicability of article 95, an opinion
binding the German National Court. Despite the use of a half-dozen
specific provisions, a hearing on the merits of an illegal tax imposed on
imported milk from France, Belgium and Luxembourg, was not to be
given by the EEC court. In the first case (Wiih/rmann) no direct appeal
was possible; in Liitticke the commission was not forced to act; whereas
in the second Liitticke holding, only three questions previously certified
by the national court were considered.
Although plaintiffs had legal rights, they had no power to compel the
commission to proceed, since a violation of treaty rights resulting in se-
vere financial loss is not a fact of the type susceptible to "judicial notice."
Of course, a contrary result can be expected if a member state is subse-
quently placed in a similar situation; affirmative action can be demanded.
Accordingly, an individual petition to a community organ serves only the
limited function of providing information; it is never a source of com-
pulsion. Therefore, no broad generalization can be made to the effect
that private persons have the right to petition the commission. Article
Accord, as to Articles 85 and 86, Italy v. EEC Comm., supra note 64.
85. Case No. 32/65, - Recueil - , CCH Common Mkt. Rep. 8048, at 7704.
Article 85 is considered in connection with Regulation 17, supra note 34. The specialized
scope of this study precludes an examination of the antitrust area.
86. Id. at 7717-19.
87. Id. at 7720. Accord, Advocate-General Roemer, id. at 7723.
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175 may be deemed an extraordinary remedy controlled by the execu-
tive's discretionary power.
In view of the relief not achieved in Liitticke, the fundamental ques-
tion of the future judicial role of the Court of Justice in a supranational
community in relation to EEC organs, member states, and private enter-
prises is timely. Insofar as individual rights within a supranational en-
tity are concerned, several elements are necessary in the opinion of Pro-
fessor Paul Reuter."s In advocating the EEC is in reality a supranational
entity, he stresses that three fundamental concepts of supranationality are
present: 1) complete independence of community organs from national
control; 2) the transfer of competence plus the power of action to the
community; and 3) a direct relationship between individuals and EEC
organs, especially the Court of Justice. The key element from the stand-
point of this study is that the EEC has the power to move directly against
nationals and even aliens physically located within the Six. 9 Thus, in
a supranational institution-possessing great political power-individ-
uals, enterprises, and non-governmental entities require a corresponding
right of action. This basic notion of justice was overlooked by the
drafters of the later Rome treaties establishing EURATOM and the
EEC. The elimination of article 33, ECSC, in favor of the more con-
servative article 173, EEC, has resulted in Lfitticke's rights existing with-
out corresponding legal remedies. This legalistic approach can be seen
in the recent South West Africa case,9" decided July 18, 1966. The pres-
88. Reuter, La Communauted du Charbon et del'Acier, 86 RECUEIL DES COURS 543-48
(1952 II) ; cited in Robertson, Problems of European Integration, id. at 146 (1957 I).
See GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 4EFORE INTERNATIONAL AND
SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 133-36 (1966) ; and Gormley, The Right of Officials and
Employees of the Common Market To Ievoke Immunity Against Their Sending States,
17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 446, 453-59 (1966). See especially REUTER, JURIDICAL AND INSTI-
TUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN REGIONAL COMMUNITIES 35-53 (Shimm ed. 1962).
89. Article 9, ECSC, Articles 1-8, EEC, and 1-3, EURATOM, in connection with
41, ECSC, and 150, EURATOM. See Erades, International Law, European Commun-
ity Law and Municipal Law of Member States, 15 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 117, 120-27
(1966); Gormley, The Procedural Status of the Individual Before Supranational Judi-
cial Tribunals, 41 U. DET. L.J. 405, 408-10 (1964) ; Van Panhuys, Conflicts Between the
Law of the European Communities and Other Rules of International Law, 3 C.M.L.
REV. 420 (1965).
See especially the Court's reference to Article 1, EEC Treaty, in connection with
177; Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., supra note 23, at 7391. Article 1, EEC, is deemed to
create direct effects between member states (and their nationals) with the EEC; hence,
domestic courts must safeguard community rights. The self-executing obligations re-
quire no implementing legislation.
90. Second Phase, Judgment. [1966] I.C.J. Rep. 6. President Sir Percy Spender
enunciated the traditional norm of individual moral and political rights, which are in-
capable of judicial enforcement. Speaking for the narrow majority of six judges, he
stated: "In the international field, the existence of obligations that cannot in the last re-
sort be enforced by any legal process, has always been the rule rather than the excep-
tion-and this was even more the case in 1920 than today." Id. f 86, at 46. Thus, as in
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ent locus standi of individuals is now briefly considered within the realm
of: 1) the positivistic school of jurisprudence and 2) the broader socio-
logical context in which the actual purpose of a common market becomes
the primary test.
Jurisconsults presently serving on the Court have no power to modify
the text of the three establishing treaties. Moreover, their judicial func-
tion precludes their offering suggestions for any expansion of existing
jurisdiction. Unlike American state and federal judges, civil law jurists
are forbidden to assume a role of leadership looking toward improvement
in the administration of justice. This limitation must be recognized by
anyone examining the EEC through Anglo-Saxon eyes.
Because a full common market does not presently exist, the delicate
position of the court must be appreciated. Consequently, the tribunal
must adhere rigidly to the intention of the treaty drafters. Because
their intention was to eliminate individual locus standi, the court must
enforce the mandate.
One may ask what the purpose of a common market is insofar as
private persons are affected ? The answer offered here is that the avail-
ability of a judicial hearing is a basic human right inherent within any
legal system, including a supranational common market. Further, an in-
dividual or enterprise injured by the community, or by the failure of a
member state to fulfill treaty obligations, should have the right of action
necessary to rectify the situation. This notion of fundamental justice-
inherent within theories of natural law-must be given serious considera-
tion by member governments and the EEC at such time as changes are
made in the three existing treaties.
A continued denial of justice because of legal technicalities will lead
to a sharp political reaction. Again, it is possible to draw an analogy
with the despicable judgment of the International Court of Justice in the
recent South West Africa case."' In brief, the mass outcry in Africa,
Asia, Latin America, and Europe against The Hague Court's refusal to
examine the merits, indicates the popular reaction that can arise from a
major judicial default. Even though the cases discussed above do not
present as dramatic an illustration of a denial of justice as does South
West Africa, one inescapable fact remains: Within the more limited six-
member EEC a strong counter action is bound to take place because of
the homogeneous nature of the communities' legal system, which are
classical international law, substantive rights may exist without judicial remedies in the
community's legal system.
91. Ibid. See the writer's forthcoming condemnation of the majority opinion;
Elimination of the Interstate Complaint: Southwest Africa Cases and Resulting Pro-
cedural Deficiencies in the ICJ.
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based on Greco-Roman notions of justice,9 2 exemplified in the Jus
Naturale. In other words, common political and legal ideals will eventu-
ally prevail over restrictive procedural standards.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The main improvement has already been suggested, namely a revi-
sion of article 173(2) in order that the superseded article 33(2), ECSC,
may once again become the legal norm. Indeed, even more liberal locus
standi seems in order.93 Along with this fundamental change, articles 88,
ECSC, and 169, EEC, should be harmonized along with articles 35,
ECSC, and 175, EEC. Once the basic modification in article 173(2)
has been effected, these "alternative treaty articles" will probably be
brought into line with the main procedural standard. Actually, article
173 has no counterpart in civil law; it is not a typical judicial remedy.
Conversely, administrative tribunals, modeled on the French Conseil
d'Eta.t, can give relief in the event of illegal actions by public agencies or
for a failure to act (including ddtournement de pouvoir).9  Similar
competence, however, has been denied the Luxembourg tribunal.
These recommendations should be activated at the time of merger of
the three executive organs-the High Authority, ECSC, and the commis-
sions of the EEC and EURATOM-into a single entity serving all three
communities.9
92. Tfnfkid~s, Regimes Internes et Organisation Internationale, 110 RECUEIL DES
COURs 271 (1963 III). See in addition, Erades, supra note 89; Hay, The Contribution
of the European Communities to International Law, [1965] PROC. A.S.I.L. 195; Schein-
gold, The Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Development of Inter-
national Law, id. at 190.
93. Accord, Rasquin & Chevallier, L'article 173, a linca o du Traiti C.E.E., 2 RE-
VUE TRIMESTIELLE DU DROIT EUROPkAN 31 (1966).
Ce serait nier, et l'existence de ce droit communautaire, et celle de la
Communaut6 elle-mfme. Les politiques peuvent se battre sur des mots, mais
les juristes doivent comprendre que la consfcration de la situation actuelle, en
matifre de recours des particuliers, peut mettre en cause l'6difice com-
munautaire plus sfirement que les querelles de vocabulaire sur la supranationalit6,
car les rfalitfs finissent toujours, les illusions s'6tant 6vanouies, par imposer
leur loi.
Une rfvision de l'article 173, alinfa 2, s'av~re donce indispensable. Le
droit de recours 6tant ouvert aux particuliers dans des limites raisonnables,
on pourra, pour le maintenir dans ces limites, faire confiance i la Cour qui a
dfjb, prouv6 A maintes reprises sa prudence et sa sagesse.
Id. at 46. Accord, GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE IN-
TERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 182-83 (1966).
94. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE
228-32 (Stein & Nicholson eds. 1960) ; Gormley, The Significant Role of French Admin-
istrative Jurisprudence as Presently Applied by the Court of the European Communi-
ties, with Emphasis on the Administrative Law Remedies Available to Private Parties,
8 S.D.L. REV. 32, 62-68 (1963).
95. For a general discussion of the problem of merging and harmonizing the re-
maining separate institutions of the three communities see Houber, The Merger of the
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Despite the desirability of above mentioned improvements, the ex-
ercise of extreme national sovereignty will probably prevent the adop-
tion of these required modifications. Sadly, European states are not yet
prepared to surrender additional sovereignty to a supranational institu-
tion. Consequently, needed solutions must be evaluated against political
realities. But if justice cannot be given injured individuals and private
enterprises the continued existence of the EEC will be at least seriously
threatened.
Executives of the European Communities, 3 C.M.L. REv. 37 (1965). See also LANG,
op. cit. supra note 61, at 6-7.
Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, Signed Brussels, April 8, 1965. Unofficial translation, EEC; reprinted
4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 776 (1965).
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